BUDDHIST ILLOGIC:
A Critical Analysis of
Nagarjuna’s Arguments
Avi Sion, Ph. D.
First published, 2002.
Abstract
The 2nd Century CE Indian philosopher Nagarjuna
founded the Madhyamika (Middle Way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, which strongly
influenced Chinese (Ch’an), Korean (Sôn) and Japanese (Zen) Buddhism, as well
as Tibetan Buddhism. Nagarjuna is regarded by many Buddhist writers to this day
as a very important philosopher, who they claim definitively proved the
futility of ordinary human cognitive means.
His writings include a series of arguments purporting to show
the illogic of logic, the absurdity of reason. He considers this the way to
verbalize and justify the Buddhist doctrine of “emptiness” (Shunyata).
These arguments attack some of the basic tenets and techniques of reasoning,
such as the laws of thought (identity, non-contradiction and the excluded
middle), conceptualization and predication, our common assumptions of self,
entities and essences, as well as our beliefs in motion and causation.
The present essay demonstrates the many sophistries involved
in Nagarjuna’s arguments. He uses double standards, applying or ignoring the
laws of thought and other norms as convenient to his goals; he manipulates his
readers, by giving seemingly logical form (like the dilemma) to his discourse,
while in fact engaged in non-sequiturs or appealing to doubtful
premises; he plays with words, relying on unclear terminology, misleading
equivocations and unfair fixations of meaning; and he ‘steals concepts’, using
them to deny the very percepts on which they are based.
Although a critique of the Madhyamika philosophical
interpretation and defense of “emptiness”, Buddhist Illogic is not
intended to dissuade readers from Buddhism. On the contrary, its aim to enhance
personal awareness of actual cognitive processes, and so improve meditation. It
is also an excellent primer on phenomenological epistemology.
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Contents
Foreword
1. The tetralemma
2. Neither real
nor unreal
3. Nagarjuna’s
use of dilemma
4. The
subject-predicate relation
5. Percepts and
concepts
6. Motion and
rest
7. Causality
8. Co-dependence
9. Karmic law
10. God and
creation
11. Self or soul
12. Self-knowledge
Afterword:
Not ‘empty logic’, but empty of logic
Appendices:
1. Fallacies
in Nagarjuna’s work
2. Brief glossary of some basic concepts
Further Description
This
essay is a critical review of some of the main arguments proposed by the Indian
Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (c. 113-213 CE), founder of the Madhyamika
(Middle Way) school, one of the Mahayana streams, which strongly influenced Chinese
(Ch’an), Korean (Sôn) and Japanese (Zen) Buddhism, as well as Tibetan Buddhism.
Specifically, the text referred to here is Empty Logic -
Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991)
by Hsueh-li Cheng, of Hawaii University (Hilo). The main source-texts of this
school of thought, to which Cheng of course often refers, are the “three
treatises” – the Middle Treatise, the Twelve Gate Treatise and
the Hundred Treatise.
The
title Empty Logic was not intended pejoratively by its author, but
simply to mean ‘logic of emptiness’, the term “emptiness” (Shunyata)
referring to the Buddhist doctrine that (briefly put, very roughly) things have
no abiding core, no essence, no fixed nature. Cheng’s work is a clear
exposition of Madhyamika history and logical techniques, but it makes no
attempt to criticize those techniques. All criticism of Madhyamika or Buddhist
logic, here, is my own.
The
present essay is not a religious tract and has no polemical intent. It is a
work of philosophy, a fair-minded logical evaluation of certain propositions
and arguments taken as philosophical positions open to discussion like any
other. It examines and discusses a goodly array of Buddhist, and in particular
Madhyamika, doctrines, but does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of
all doctrines or of all aspects of those dealt with.
However,
I do not attempt here to develop a historical perspective, or to list the
various tendencies and their interrelations. Cheng’s book includes an
interesting exposition of the development of Madhyamika philosophy, from
Nagarjuna in the 2nd century CE through to the Yogachara school and
on. However, he fails to investigate in sufficient detail the development of
Buddhist philosophy prior to Nagarjuna, barely mentioning several centuries of
earlier Theravada (Hinayana) philosophy and the early phases (starting 1st
cent. CE, and before) of Mahayana reaction (e.g. the Mahasanghikas). To better
understand Nagarjuna’s motives and goals, it would be well to be acquainted
with this background.
My
naming the present essay Buddhist Illogic should not be taken to imply
that I consider all Buddhist philosophy or even all Madhyamika as illogical. It
merely reflects my focus here on some of the (many) illogical arguments used in
Nagarjuna’s discourse. Indeed, some of Nagarjuna’s arguments and beliefs have
been refuted or rejected by other Buddhist philosophers. Buddhist philosophy is
not monolithic, but a constellation of philosophies with as their common ground
the (alleged) pronouncements of Buddhism’s founder. I do here challenge some
underlying Buddhist doctrines, but only incidentally, not systematically.
I
would have named this essay less pejoratively ‘Buddhist Logic’ if I had found
some interesting new thought forms to report. Buddhism and Nagarjuna do indeed
use valid as well as invalid forms of reasoning, but these forms (those I found
so far) are all familiar to us today, and so not notable except for historical
purposes (where we would try and determine whether Buddhist usage antedates
usage in Greek or other writings). However, my main justification is that much
of Buddhism itself, and particularly Nagarjuna’s version of it, cheerfully
proclaims itself free of or beyond logic, or illogical and even anti-logical.
On a
personal note, I want to stress my admiration for Buddhism in general, which
has taught me much, both in the way of living skills and through its
philosophical insights. So I cannot be accused of approaching this subject with
any antagonistic prejudice. I read Empty Logic eager to learn from it,
rather than to find fault with it. As a philosopher and logician I am however
duty bound to analyze and judge philosophies dispassionately, and this is what
I do here. Generally speaking, I have little interest in criticizing other
people’s philosophical works, because I could write thick volumes doing so.
Life is unfortunately too short for that, so I prefer to pass it developing a
constructive statement. Nevertheless, one generally learns a lot through
debate, and I can say that challenging Nagarjuna has helped me to clarify
various philosophical problems and possible solutions.
Finally,
let me say that the message of “Buddha” (the enlightened) Siddhartha Gautama
(563-483 BCE), about “emptiness”, which as is well known is essentially
non-verbal, should not be confused with Nagarjuna’s or any other writer’s
attempted philosophical interpretation, explanation and justification of
related ideas. Thus, to refute the latter does not necessarily deny the former.
